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Abstract
By applying Smooth Transition Regressions (Teräsvirta, 1998) we test whether
e¤ects on short (STA) and long term (LTA) sickness absence depend on the level
of unemployment. The main question is to what extent unemployment a¤ects sick-
ness absence through so-called discipline and/or composition e¤ects. The empirical
analysis is carried out on time series data referring to blue collar workers in Norway.
For LTA we conclude that only discipline e¤ects are present. Concerning STA, none
of these e¤ects seems present among women, whereas both e¤ects may be present
among men. Non-linear e¤ects of wage and sick pay scheme changes support these
conclusions.
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1 Introduction
A number of studies, based on data from di¤erent countries, report that increased unem-
ployment reduce sickness absence.1 At least from the viewpoint of economics, discipline
and composition mechanisms are the two main explanations of a negative relationship
between sickness absence and unemployment.2
Unemployment may operate as a discipline mechanism because workers in periods of
high unemployment are more likely to go to work even if they are sick. The reason is
that workers with ”bad” absence records are more likely to be dismissed than those with
“good” records, and it is more di¢cult to …nd a new job when unemployment is high.
Furthermore, in situations of high unemployment employers have more people to choose
among, so it becomes less risky to …re workers because it is easier to …nd new workers.
The composition mechanism can be explained as follows: Under the assumption that
labour supply is constant, increased unemployment means that …rms go out of business
but also that …rms carry out manning reductions. If …rms dismiss so-called ”marginal
workers”, e.g., workers with health problems, the average health condition among those
at work improves so that sickness absence is reduced.3
The main aim of this paper is to identify these two e¤ects empirically by investigating
whether changes in unemployment a¤ect sickness absence di¤erently in periods of ”high”
unemployment as compared to periods of ”low” unemployment.
It is both interesting and important to separate these two e¤ects empirically. High
rates of sickness absence means that a corresponding large part of the working force is
1On time series data Doherty (1979), Lantto and Lindblom (1987), Kenyon and Dawkins (1989), and
Dyrstad and Lysø (1998) …nd evidence of a negative relationship between absence and unemployment.
Based on cross-section data the studies by Allen (1981), Chaudhury and Ng (1992), Drago and Wooden
(1992), and Johanson and Palme (1996) also get results supporting the negative relationship.
2A third is that working pressure is reduced when unemployment is high because low unemployment
corresponds to low demand in product markets and consequently reduced production. So under the
reasonable assumption that reduced working pressure reduces sickness absence, this may also explain
a negative relationship between sickness absence and unemployment. On the other hand, it has been
mentioned that higher unemployment may increase absence, because increased unemployment may create
psychical problems among workers due to increased economic and social uncertainty, which lead to more
sickness absence.
3To this it should be added that it is formally illegal in Norway and other countries to dismiss a worker
for the reason that she or he has a high rate of sickness absence. However, we think that there are informal
channels that can be used to get rid of the least productive workers in case of manning reductions, for
instance by changing organisational structure. Refering to Norway, there is some research on demand for
disability pensions which by analogy supports this. Dahl (1990), Halvorsen and Johannesen (1991) and
Hippe and Pedersen (1991) …nd that in the end of the 1980s, when unemployment started to rise sharply
in Norway, several …rms wishing to carry out manning reductions, were able to transfer elderly workers
to diability pension schemes.
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out of work. It is obviously neither an aim nor possible to bring absence rates down to
zero, but absence rate changes will change e¤ective labour supply, and in this respect it
is as important as lowering unemployment rates. Furthermore, sickness absence repre-
sents costs, to the employees and employers directly involved, and to society as a whole.
Therefore concern for sickness absence often appear in public debate, and governments
take steps to a¤ect sickness absence. For instance, in the …rst part of the 1990s the gov-
ernment made several minor changes in the Norwegian sick pay scheme to reduce sickness
allowances paid by National Insurance, which in 1991 was still at the peak of 1.8 per cent
of gross domestic product. Recent calculations by Hem (2000) indicate that on average
a lost working day in Norway due to sickness absence increases …rms’ cost by 120% be-
yond wage costs. For …rms in manufacturing industries and building and constructions
the costs are even higher. For employees in general, sickness absence represents personal
su¤ering and deterioration of skills, thereby reducing competition in the labour market
and the possibilities of having higher future income.
In a situation with increasing sickness absence it is therefore often called upon policy
measures to bring it down. If increases in sickness absence appear when unemployment
is falling, it is important to know what kind of mechanisms are in operation in order
to design e¤ective policy measures. If the increases are most likely to be explained by
composition mechanisms, one would reasonably think of measures directed towards …rms
and employees. One example could be incentives stimulating …rms to improve working
conditions so that ”marginal” workers are able to work. Another example could be train-
ing programs. In Norway a special programme designed to combine absence and work at
the individual level was introduced in 1991. On the other hand, if higher absence is due
discipline mechanisms, it seems more reasonable to design macro measures, e.g., making
compensation schemes more restrictive.
Our paper does not only focus on e¤ects of changes in unemployment, and the iden-
ti…cation of composition and discipline mechanisms. Also possible non-linear e¤ects of
changes in the sick pay scheme and wages are addressed.
Empirically we apply the Smooth Transition Regression (STR) approach (Teräsvirta,
1998), both to identify the composition and discipline mechanisms, and to model other
non-linearities in sickness absence. An important assumption behind our identi…cation
approach is that the discipline e¤ect is stronger if the level of unemployment is “high”
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as compared to “low” levels of unemployment. This assumption and the hypothesis of
composition mechanism identify the discipline and composition e¤ects empirically. The
empirical analysis is carried out on quarterly time series data covering the period 1971
(3) - 1998 (2).4 Data refer to blue collar workers, separated w.r.t. gender, and we use
series for both long and short term absence spells.
The plan of the paper is as follows. We use a standard model of individual labour
supply to discuss the discipline mechanism, and a discussion of this model and its relation
to composition mechanisms is given in Section 2. Section 3 and 4 present data on sickness
absence and unemployment, and the empirical analysis, respectively. Estimation results
are given and discussed in Section 5. Section 6 contains conclusions.
2 Hypotheses
We may discuss discipline e¤ects within the standard model of individual labour supply,5
having a representative worker with a strictly quasi-concave utility function with levels
of consumption and leisure as arguments, and the following budget restriction:
Consumption =W [h¡ (1¡ k)A]¡ P (A;U): (1)
The variable A is number of hours absent from work, W is the real disposable wage rate,
h is standard working hours and k is degree of economic compensation if absent from
work. If k=1 the worker is fully compensated, while k=0 implies no compensation.
The penalty function P (A;U) is a central part of the model as it causes the possible
non-linearities we are investigating. We have formulated penalty to depend on individual
absence and the aggregate rate of unemployment, U , and we assume that it is convex and
increasing in A, i.e., both @P=@A and @2P=@A2 are positive. Furthermore, we assume
that P (0; U) = 0.6 The reason for including penalty in the budget restriction is that
absence represents costs to …rms. Firms may reduce costs by creating expectations of
reduced bonuses, fringe bene…ts and career opportunities for workers with high rates of
4The number in paranthesis refers to quarter.
5This is a common theoretical framework in absence research by economists, see Brown and Sessions
(1996). However, discipline mechanisms could also be discussed within e¢ciency wage models, as in
Barmby et al. (1994).
6A unique solution to utility maximization is possible even if @2P=@A2 = 0, but it seems reasonable to
assume that it is strict positive.
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absence. Increased possibilities of being dismissed if the …rm has to reduce employment
are particularly important. Penalty in terms of reduced income therefore depends on
labor market conditions so that penalty is higher when unemployment is high, also at the
margin. Hence, @P=@U > 0 and @2P=@A@U > 0.
Given the budget restriction (1) and a standard time restriction, utility maximization
gives the condition that the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption
equals the price of leisure, which is also the price of being absent from work. From the …rst
order conditions the representative worker’s absence relation may in general be expressed
as
A = A(W;k;U; h): (2)
Assuming that leisure (absence) and consumption are normal goods, we obtain from
this model unambiguous predictions of unemployment changes and degree of economic
compensation, i.e., @A=@U < 0 and @A=@k > 0. However, a higher wage rate has an
ambiguous e¤ect on absence because the income and substitution e¤ects work in opposite
directions. A su¢cient condition for a positive relation between absence and standard
working hours is that marginal utility of leisure is not reduced if consumption increases.
The central question in this paper concerns the form of the relationship between
absence and unemployment in equation (2). Based on the above model, the answer de-
pends on the penalty function. Technically, the sign of @2A=@U2 depends on the signs of
@2P=@U2 and two third order derivatives of the penalty function. If we assume that the
two third order derivatives are negligible, the relationship between absence and unemploy-
ment is concave (convex) if the penalty function is convex (concave) in unemployment.7
If the penalty function is convex in unemployment, this means that an increase in
unemployment ”punish” more when unemployment is ”high” as compared to a ”low” level
of unemployment. The relationship between absence and unemployment is then concave.
7The two third order derivatives are @
¡
@2P (¢)=@A@U¢ =@U and @ ¡@2P (¢)=@A2¢ =@U . Setting these
equal to zero gives @2A(¢)=@U2 = (@A(¢)=@Y ) £ (@2P (¢)=@U2), saying that it depends on the income
e¤ect and the form of the relationship between penalty and unemployment. So if these third order
derivatives are zero and leisure is a normal good, it follows that the form of the relationship between
absence and unemployment depends on @2P (¢)=@U2. The derivative @ ¡@2P (¢)=@A@U¢ =@U = 0 implies
that the marginal e¤ect of sick absence on penalty if unemployment increases is unaltered if unemployment
becomes even higher. Setting @
¡
@2P (¢)=@A2¢ =@U = 0 means that the convexity of the penalty function
in absence is the same irrespective of unemployment level. All the analytical results can be obtained from
the authors upon request.
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The reason is that a ”low” level of unemployment requires a relatively small reduction
in absence to keep penalty constant when unemployment increases. On the other hand,
if the level of unemployment is ”high”, an increase in unemployment ”punish” relatively
much more so a larger reduction in absence is necessary to keep penalty constant.
By the same line of reasoning, a concave penalty function gives a convex relation-
ship between absence and unemployment. In this setting an increase in unemployment
”punish” more if the level of unemployment is ”low” as compared to an increase in unem-
ployment when the unemployment level is ”high”, with corresponding ”large” and ”small”
reductions in absence to keep penalty constant.
In the following we assume that the penalty function is convex in unemployment be-
cause workers having high rates of absence are more likely to be dismissed than those with
low rates, and because the probability of being dismissed increases with unemployment.
In addition, it is much more di¢cult to get a new job if unemployment is high. Thus it
is reasonable that penalty at the margin is higher when the unemployment level is high.
The concave relationship between absence and unemployment is illustrated in Figure 1.
U
A
ULOW UHIGH
Transition pointdA
dA
dU dU
Figure 1: The relationship between absence and unemployment when penalty is convex
in unemployment.
The composition hypothesis states that the level of unemployment a¤ects composi-
tion of those who have work, and therefore sickness absence: If …rms have to increase
employment they have to hire workers who have more health problems if unemployment
is low.8 Consequently, the rate of sickness absence is higher when the unemployment level
8The underlying assumption here is that …rms have full information regarding the distribution of
productivity among workers, and that hiring is made according to descending productivity.
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is low, and vice versa. This implies that an increase in unemployment in a situation with
”low” unemployment will reduce sickness absence, whereas an increase in unemployment
given a ”high” unemployment level will have a much smaller (negligible) e¤ect on absence
through composition mechanisms.
On this background we therefore have the following e¤ects, assuming that penalty
is convex in unemployment: In a setting of a su¢ciently low level of unemployment
increased unemployment a¤ects absence through discipline e¤ects (DE in the following)
but negligibly through composition e¤ects (CE in the following). A su¢ciently high level
of unemployment gives the opposite picture, negative DE and negligible CE. In both
settings we get a negative total e¤ect. The e¤ects are listed in Table 1.
Estimating unemployment e¤ects which are zero in both settings implies that there are
neither composition nor discipline e¤ects. If the estimated unemployment e¤ects are neg-
ative in both settings, it follows that the estimate corresponding to ”low” unemployment
captures CE, whereas the estimate corresponding to ”high” unemployment represents DE.
The line of reasoning in Table 1 may also be used to illustrate that a penalty function
which is concave in unemployment gives ambiguous predictions regarding CE and DE.
In that case DE will be much larger in absolute value when unemployment is ”low” as
compared to a ”high” level of unemployment. But as already explained, the same applies
to CE. Hence, it is not possible to separate the two e¤ects because both DE and CE give
the strongest e¤ects when unemployment is low.
To illustrate the close connection between our hypotheses and the chosen empirical
approach, we have in Figure 1 drawn a linearized version of the concave relationship
between absence and unemployment, consisting of two linear parts. The point where
these two lines meet gives the transition point which we are going to estimate by applying
the Smooth Transition Regression (STR) approach.9 This approach does not imply that
we impose restrictions on the empirical models of a concave relationship between sickness
absence and unemployment.
9One transition point re‡ects that we have a logistic STR model in mind, see the Section 4.
6
Table 1: Identifying discipline and composition e¤ects when the penalty function is
convex in unemployment.
 Level of unemployment 
Type of effects ”Low” ”High” 
Discipline (DE) 
 Negligible Negative 
Composition (CE) 
 Negative Negligible 
Total 
 Negative Negative 
Estimated 
effect is zero No composition No discipline 
Estimated 
effect is negative Composition only Discipline only 
 
3 Data
The analyses are based on aggregate quarterly data collected and published by Confeder-
ation of Norwegian Business and Industry (NHO10) from the …rst quarter of 1971 to the
second quarter of 1998. NHO is the main organization for employers in manufacturing
industries, services and crafts in Norway. Our data refer to blue collar adult workers,
separated by gender. The series of absence rates11 are collected from a constant sample
of representative NHO …rms. The last included quarter (second quarter of 1998) con-
tained data from …rms employing 80 179 workers of which 65 620 were men. Wage data
are collected from all member …rms of NHO. In second quarter of 1998, wage data were
collected from …rms with 28 000 female workers and 144 000 male workers.12
Duration of absence spells is divided into two categories. The …rst is short term
absence, which refers to sickness spells lasting until 3 days plus absence registered as
shirking, hereafter denoted STA. The second category is long term absence, corresponding
to sickness spells lasting 4 days or more, hereafter referred to as LTA. This division
of short and long term absence spells makes this data set very appropriate for testing
our hypotheses as STA has to be absence not covering serious sickness. In relation to
10Næringslivets Hovedorganisasjon.
11Rate of absence=
registered days absent from work due to sickness
number of days actually worked+registered days absent
¤ 100:
12See NHO (1971-1998).
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possible e¤ects of changes of days without sickness allowances and self-certi…cation in the
Norwegian sick pay scheme, this is also a fruitful division.13 The absence series and the
unemployment rate are illustrated in Figures 2-4.
Figure 2 shows that STA is higher among women than men, but the di¤erence becomes
smaller throughout the period. In the …rst eight years of the period, male absence was
growing from about 70% to 85% of female absence. From late seventies to mid eighties
male absence varied from 95% to about 80% of female absence. From the second quarter
of 1986 to 1991 male absence fell more than female absence and in the third quarter of
1990 male absence was about 77% of female absence. The di¤erences were decreasing in
the rest of the period, and in 1997 short term absence was approximately at the same
level for both genders. However, the two series seem to have similar paths: increases
in the seventies, peaks in the early eighties, reductions until third quarter of 1991 and
thereafter some increase.
Figure 3 illustrates the paths of LTA for women and men, and the picture is quite
di¤erent from the STA series.
It is interesting to note that the gender gap does not shrink during the period but on
the contrary seems to increase. Male absence was about 75% of female absence in the
seventies, but the gap increased constantly throughout the period, and in the end of the
period LTA for men was about 60% of female absence. However, the main patterns are
quite gender unspeci…c. LTA fell until 1976-77 and raised to an all time high in 1986/87.
Then the absence rates fell again until minima were reached in the mid-nineties. Since
then LTA has increased for both women and men.
Figure 4 gives the development in the national unemployment rate. In the seventies
the unemployment rate was low and stable, although a weak positive trend is visible. A
local peak is reached in 1984, thereafter a rather sharp decrease for a few years only to
grow steadily through the rest of the eighties and into the nineties. Then the economy
began to grow and the unemployment rate fell into the millennium.
When we compare these series, there are some important features to mention. When
unemployment is low but slightly increasing, as in the seventies, LTA is high but decreases
slightly, while STA is high and increases. When unemployment increases rapidly, as from
1988, LTA decreases.
13For details, see Section 4.2.
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Figure 2: Short Term Absence Rates for Women and Men
Quarterly Data and Moving Average
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Figure 3: Long Term Absence Rates for Women and Men
Quarterly Data and Moving Average
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Figure 4: The National Unemployment Rate (per cent)
Quarterly Data and Moving Average
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Also STA decreases from 1987. This may indicate di¤erent relations between absence
and unemployment in periods of high versus low levels of unemployment. However, LTA
seems to have a clear inverse relation to the unemployment level while the relation for STA
seems to be more mixed. Altogether, this indicates that it is interesting to investigate the
relationship between absence and unemployment.
4 Empirical Analysis
We apply the Smooth Transition Regression (STR) model formulated by Teräsvirta (1998)
to test the hypotheses outlined in Section 2. This model may in general be written as
yt = x
0
t'+ (z
0
tµ)G(°; c; st) + "t; (3)
where xt is the vector of explanatory variables in the linear part of the model, and zt is
the vector of explanatory variables entering the non-linear part. In our general models all
the continuous variables included in the linear part will also be included in the non-linear
part (except the dummy variables), so zt 2 xt. The vectors ' = ('0; '1; :::; 'p)0 and
µ = (µ0; µ1; :::; µp)
0 contain the parameters of the linear and non-linear parts, respectively,
and f"tg is a sequence of independent, identically distributed errors. In (3) G(:) is a
bounded continuous transition function, and it is customary to bound G(:) between zero
and unity. The variable st is the transition variable, c is the transition point and ° gives
the slope of the transition function. The parameters c and ° will be estimated.
The objective of this paper is to analyse to what extent the unemployment level
in‡uences absence, so the rate of unemployment is the obvious choice of transition variable.
Furthermore, we have to make a choice of transition function, and one alternative is the
logistic STR model (LSTR1) given by
G1(°; c; st) = [1 + expf¡°(st ¡ c)g]¡1; ° > 0: (4)
This function is monotonically increasing in st with ° > 0 as identifying restriction. The
slope parameter ° indicates the speed of transition from zero to unity, and the parameter
c locates the transition. If ° !1 in (4) the STR model becomes a switching regression
model with st as switching variable. For all four types of sickness absence (cf. Section
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3) we start by …rst estimating rather general STR models and simplify these to well
speci…ed parsimonious models through a reduction process. We use the LSTR1 model in
this reduction process. However, the validity of using this functional form is checked by
testing the parsimonious models against two alternative transition functions.14
Referring to the STR model given by equation (3), yt, and the vectors xt and zt are
de…ned as follows:
yt = ¢aijt (5)
x0t = (1; aijt¡1; wit¡1; ut¡1; s74t¡1; s78t¡1; s84t¡1; s91t¡1; (6)
¢aijt¡` ;¢wijt;¢wijt¡1;¢ut;¢ut¡1;¢s74t;¢s78t;
¢s84t;¢s91t;Q1; Q2;Q3)
z0t = (1; aijt¡1; wit¡1; ut¡1; (7)
¢aijt¡1;¢wijt;¢wijt¡1;¢ut;¢ut¡1)
Respectively, the vectors xt and zt correspond to the linear and non-linear parts of our
starting general STR models. All but the dummy variables are log transformed, and ¢
denotes …rst di¤erence. The variable aijt is the rate of sickness absence, where index i
refers to gender (w=women, m=men), j refers to duration of absence spells, and t refers
to time (quarters), respectively. As explained in Section 3, duration of absence spells is
divided into two categories: Sickness spells lasting until 3 days plus absence registered as
shirking [aw3t and am3t in equation (5)], and sickness spells lasting 4 days or more [aw4t and
am4t in equation (5)]. Thus, and consistent with the notation in Section 4, in the following
short term absence (STAi) refers to j=3 and long term absence (LTAi) to j=4. The other
variables are de…ned as follows: wit is nominal hourly earnings de‡ated by the national
consumer price index; ut is the national rate of unemployment; ht is normal working
hours; and Qr represent seasonal dummies where r refers to corresponding quarter.
The dummy variables sYt (Y = 74; 78; 84 and 91) are included to capture important
changes in the sick pay scheme, and take the value 1 from the quarter of change, and
14The alternative transition functions are the non-monotonic three-regime STR model and the expo-
nential STR model, respectively [1+ expf¡°(st¡ c1)(st¡ c2)g]¡1 (LSTR2) and [1 + expf¡°(st ¡ c)2g]¡1
(ESTR). See Teräsvirta (1998).
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zero otherwise. In 1974 the number of days without sickness allowances was reduced from
three to one, so that employees receive pay for all days in a sickness spell except the
…rst one. An important reform was implemented 1 July 1978. The reform directed all
employers to pay sickness allowances for the …rst fourteen days of a sickness spell while
the rest of the spell should be covered by National Insurance, implying that all groups of
employees were given the same formal rights in case of sickness. In addition, the one day
without sickness allowances was abolished, and so-called self-certi…cation was introduced,
saying that an employee may have until six spells of sickness absence of up to three days
duration during the year without being medically certi…ed. In 1984 the total number
of self-certi…cations during the year was reduced from six to four, and the counting of
absence days became more restrictive. Several means were introduced in 1991 in order
to reduce growth in National Insurance expenditures, of which the most important seem
to be to stimulate combinations of pay from work and sickness allowances, and more
e¤ective control of doctors’ practice of issuing medical certi…cates. However, the 1991
dummy is also included to capture possible e¤ects of the so-called LO-NHO project to
reduce sickness absence.15
The parameters in the STR model are estimated by applying a variable-metric ap-
proach algorithm for non-linear optimization according to the BFGS update (see Hendry,
1995). Initial parameter values may be critical for reaching global maxima, and we have
used estimates obtained from OLS regressions for di¤erent sets of ° and c as such values.
Combinations of estimates giving the smallest sum of squared residuals are used as initial
values.16
Parameter estimates of the parsimonious STRmodels are given in Appendix, and these
models have been exposed to several mis-speci…cation tests.17 None of the null hypotheses
of no autocorrelation in the error terms are rejected at a 5% level of signi…cance (LM
tests). We also conclude that the models are well speci…ed with respect to functional
form of the transition function, and that unemployment as transition variable models
non-linearity su¢ciently in all cases.18 Following the test suggested by Eitrheim and
15This project started in 1991, and is a co-operation between Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions
(LO) and Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry (NHO).
16Usually 100 °0s and 50 c’s are tried, i:e:; 5,000 di¤erent OLS regressions are compared.
17The detailed test results can be obtained from the authors upon request.
18The STAM model is not tested because all the variables (with the exception of dummies) entering
the linear part of the model also are included in the non-linear part. Thus there are no variables left to
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Teräsvirta (1996), we …nd no indications of remaining non-linearity in the models for
STA and LTAM . However, there are indications of the opposite conclusion regarding
LTAW . Potential remaining non-linearity in LTAW has been investigated by including
alternative transition variables in the LTAW model. Due to increased complexity both
regarding interpretation and testing these speci…cations have been discarded. We …nd
no statistically signi…cant indications of non-constant parameters in the models for STA.
Considering the non-constancy tests of LTAW , one or more of the non-dummy parameters
in the linear part of the model seems to be linearly trended.19 From the tests of LTAM ,
we …nd indications of a non-constant intercept in the non-linear part of the model.
The STR methodology requires stationary variables, and this also applies to the tran-
sition variable. Augmented Dickey Fuller tests indicate that all the level variables included
in our models have unit roots, also the rate of unemployment. This means that we by
assumption consider unemployment to be a stationary variable, which is a reasonable as-
sumption on theoretical grounds. To test whether the level variables co-integrate, we have
applied an augmented Dickey Fuller test on the residuals obtained from the parsimonious
STR models. Based on this test we conclude that the level variables co-integrate.20
The above referred mis-speci…cation tests tell us that the models are fairly well spec-
i…ed. However, we …nd indications of parameter non-constancy in the LTA relations, but
the problem is …rst and foremost related to LTAW . For LTAW we also …nd indications of
remaining non-linearity. On the other hand, the STA models pass all tests.
5 Results
In Tables 2 and 3 the long and short run parameter estimates of the parsimonious STR
models are given for unemployment levels su¢ciently below and above the points of
transition, so that the values of the transition functions equal zero and one, respectively.21
When commenting the results we refer to G=0 as ”low unemployment”, which means that
unemployment is su¢ciently below the estimated transition point to give this value of the
estimated transition. Consequently, G=1 refers to ”high unemployment”, which implies
be included in this second transition function.
19After a more thorough testing sequence we …nd indications that non-constancy may be related to the
parameters of at¡1 and ¢at¡1.
20This conclusion is based on critical values for linear models.
21The parameter estimates and corresponding t-values of these four models are given in Appendix.
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that unemployment is su¢ciently higher than the estimated point of transition.22
From Table 2 it is seen that for short term absence among women, STAW , the esti-
mated point of transition is 2.6%. Unemployment was below this level until 1983. After
a short period of relatively high unemployment, the rate fell below 2.6% in the beginning
of 1985, but from 1989 above 2.6%. (See Figure 3) We also see that the transitions occurs
relatively fast since ° is estimated to 11.5. For STA men, STAM ; the transition point is
estimated to 1.7%. The rate of unemployment was below this level until 1982 and the
two years 1986 and 1987, and above during the years 1982-85. From 1989 and throughout
the estimation period it was above. As ° is estimated to 484, the STR model for STAM
clearly is a switching regression model. The di¤erence between the transition points for
STAW and STAM seems signi…cant. However, the periods of unemployment above and
below these transition points are not very di¤erent because unemployment rises and falls
sharply in the actual intervals of transition, cf. Figure 3.
The points of transition in long term absence also di¤er for women and men, as they
are estimated to 1.6% for LTAW and 1.9% for LTAM . The di¤erence is not as large as for
STA, so the periods of unemployment above and below the points of transition are very
much the same. A more important di¤erence concerns the estimate of °, which is much
lower for LTAW , giving a much smoother transition than for men.
In Table 2 and 3 we have also reported results from linear models, denoted LIN.
These models are very similar to the models estimated by Dyrstad and Lysø (1998). The
models in ibid. are estimated on data from the period 1971-92, while the LIN models
are estimated on the same sample as is used for the STR models [1971(3)-1998(2)]. The
estimates are very similar with a few exceptions, of which one is particularly important in
relation to the topic of this paper: The estimated unemployment elasticities for LTA are
much larger in absolute value in the LIN models as compared to those estimated on the
1971-92 sample. Furthermore, the wage rate and the 1991 dummy in the LTAM relation
have statistically insigni…cant e¤ects in the LIN model. Mis-speci…cation tests indicate
that the models in ibid. and the LIN models are well speci…ed. Based on estimated
standard errors the STR models improve …t by approximately 15% for STA and 10% for
LTA relative to the LIN models.
22As explained in a preceding section, the transition from G=0 to G=1 also depends on the size of °,
so when we use the terms ”su¢ciently above” or ”below”, we mean that unemployment is so high that
we are in one of the corresponding states.
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Table 2: Parameter Estimates from STR and Linear Models (LIN)
Short Term Absence (STA)
 Women Men 
 G=0 G=1 LIN G=0 G=1 LIN 
Long Run Estimates       
w 0.34 0.23 0.38 - - - 
u - - -0.13 -0.13 -0.19 -0.17 
s74 - - - 0.17 0.08 0.19 
s78 - - 0.06 0.24 0.12 0.23 
s84 -0.17 -0.12 -0.15 -0.24 -0.12 -0.15 
s91 -0.17 -0.12 -0.15 - - - 
Short Run Estimates     
∆wt - - - - - - 
∆ut -0.10 -0.10 -0.18 - -0.15 -0.19 
∆ait-1 -0.23 0.21 - -0.25 0.36 - 
∆ s84 -0.20 -0.20 -0.24 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 
Intercept -1.50 -1.50 -1.67 0.15 0.59 0.18 
Q1 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.09 0.08 
Q2 -0.14 -0.14 -0.21 -0.06 -0.06 -0.19 
Q3 -0.13 -0.13 -0.14 -0.12 -0.12 -0.14 
γ 11.53 - 484 - 
c 2.57 - 1.65 - 
R2 0.89 0.84 0.90 0.86 
100*SSE 5.65 6.62 5.46 6.25 
NOTES: R2=coefficient of determination, 100*SSE=estimated standard error (in per cent). 
 
There are important di¤erences to be noted when we compare the STR results and the
LIN results, and when we compare results from periods of high and low unemployment
obtained from the STR models. In the following we concentrate on discussing unemploy-
ment e¤ects, but also results concerning wage changes and changes in the sick pay scheme
will be discussed. We start by …rst looking at the results for STA.
Based on the STR model unemployment does not a¤ect STAW in the long run, which
is contrary to the estimate from the LIN model. On the other hand, for STAM both
the STR model and the LIN model indicate that unemployment is important. But the
di¤erences between high and low unemployment, and between the STR model and the
LIN model are small. These results indicate that in the long run neither discipline (DE)
nor composition (CE) are important for STAW , while both DE and CE may be important
for STAM . The short run unemployment elasticities for STAW are signi…cant but identical
in high and low unemployment, and smaller in absolute value than the estimate obtained
from the LIN model. For STAM we estimate only short run e¤ects when unemployment is
15
high, and this estimate has approximately the same size as in the LIN model. According
to our hypotheses in Section 2 these results could be interpreted as short run DE for
STAM , and a mixture of short run DE and CE for STAW .
STAM is not a¤ected of wage changes in the long run, and there are no short run
wage e¤ects present in short term absence, irrespective of model. But there is a di¤erence
regarding women: The long run wage elasticity is higher when unemployment is low,
whereas the corresponding estimate in LIN is marginally higher.
Turning to e¤ects of changes in the sick pay scheme, we estimate both short and long
run e¤ects of the 1984 reform. The short run estimates are identical in high and low
unemployment, and rather similar both in the STR and LIN models. The more generous
changes in 1974 and 1978 increase STAM to a much larger extent in periods of low unem-
ployment. The long run elasticities are respectively .17 and .24 in low unemployment, but
only the half when unemployment is high. Sick pay scheme changes could be interpreted
as discipline mechanisms because they change employees’ budget restrictions, so these
di¤erences are reasonable. With estimates of -.24 in low and -.12 in high unemployment
the same applies to the restrictions implemented in 1984: In periods of low (high) un-
employment the discipline e¤ects are weaker (stronger), so there is more (less) ”room”
for absence reductions due to for instance restrictions in the sick pay scheme. Regarding
the 1974 and 1978 reforms the results from the LIN model are very similar to the STR
results when unemployment is low, but similar to the results corresponding to periods of
high unemployment regarding the 1984 reform.
The reforms in 1974 and 1978 do not a¤ect STAW , whereas the restrictions imple-
mented in 1984 and 1991 a¤ect this type of absence slightly more in periods of low un-
employment. It follows from Table 2 that these results are very similar to those obtained
from the LIN model.
In the sense that the unemployment estimates indicate stronger discipline e¤ects
among men than among women, the above interpretations of the reform e¤ects are con-
sistent with the interpretations of the unemployment e¤ects.
Turning to long term absence in Table 3, there are also some important di¤erences both
between the STR models and the LIN models, and between high versus low unemployment
within the STR models.
The long run e¤ects of unemployment changes from the STR model are larger in
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absolute value than the LIN results, and we also see that LTA is only a¤ected during
periods of high unemployment. It is also interesting to note that the long run elasticities
are rather similar in size, -.41 and -.48 respectively for women and men. The short run
elasticities are much smaller, and similar in periods of high and low unemployment for
STAW . A short run e¤ect is obtained only in periods of high unemployment for LTAM .23
Within the framework of our hypotheses in Section 2, these results have to be interpreted
as strong discipline e¤ects.
Wage changes also a¤ect long term absence di¤erently in the STR and LIN models,
and there are large di¤erences between low and high unemployment. In absolute value the
long run wage elasticities are half the size in periods of low unemployment as compared
to periods of high unemployment. For LTAW the estimate from LIN is approximately
equal to the STR estimate corresponding to low unemployment, whereas wage changes
do not a¤ect LTAM in the LIN model. Short run wage e¤ects are only obtained from the
STR model for LTAM with no di¤erence between low and high unemployment.
We estimate negative wage elasticities, which within the labour supply model in Sec-
tion 2 should be interpreted as dominating substitution e¤ects. The positive estimates of
the wage elasticities for STAW indicate dominating income e¤ects for this type of model.
We also obtain important results regarding changes in sick pay scheme. The long run
e¤ects of the 1978 change are much smaller in the STR model than in the LIN model,
and there are di¤erences between low and high unemployment. For both women and men
the estimates in high unemployment are not far from twice the size of the estimates in
low unemployment. We expect these estimates to be positive, so it is surprising that the
short run impact e¤ect in the STR model for LTAW is negative. This could be explained
as adjustment e¤ects in wake of the long run increase in absence.
The change implemented in 1984 a¤ects only LTAW , and the long run estimates are
smaller when unemployment is low than high, whereas the estimate from LIN is the
average of these two estimates. Short run e¤ects of the 1984 change are also estimated
for LTAW only, and there is no di¤erence between low and high unemployment. As the
1984 reform implied a more restrictive sick pay scheme directed towards STA, we would
not expect this reform to a¤ect LTA.
23The short run unemployment dynamics in the LIN model includes ¢2ut, saying that the speed of
change in unemployment is important. This variable was included in Dyrstad and Lysø but in the STR
model we assume the non-linear components to be su¢ciently modelled by the transition function.
17
Table 3: Parameter Estimates from STR and Linear Models (LIN)
Long Term Absence (LTA)
 Women Men 
 G=0 G=1 LIN G=0 G=1 LIN 
Long Run Estimates       
w -0.35 -0.70 -0.31 -0.51 -0.95 - 
u - -0.41 -0.12 - -0.48 -0.33 
s78 0.07 0.11 0.21 0.08 0.14 0.38 
s84 0.11 0.18 0.15 - - - 
s91 - - -0.09 - - - 
Short Run Estimates     
∆wt - - - -0.38 -0.38 - 
∆2ut - - -0.10 - - -0.04 
∆ut -0.07 -0.07 - - -0.13 - 
∆ait-1 - -0.28 -0.16 -0.18 -0.18 -0.29 
∆ s78 -0.06 -0.06     
∆ s84 0.07 0.07 - - - - 
Intercept 3.77 3.77 1.68 2.5 2.25 0.26 
Q1 - - - - - - 
Q2 -0.14 -0.14 -0.18 -0.14 -0.14 -0.15 
Q3 -0.22 -0.22 -0.19 -0.12 -0.12 -0.13 
γ 2.47 - 20.5 - 
c 1.64 - 1.86 - 
R2 0.93 0.92 0.87 0.82 
100*SSE 3.56 3.93 3.19 3.60 
NOTES: See Table 2. 
 
Dyrstad and Lysø (1998) get a similar contradiction, and they point at three possible
explanations. First, the restrictions implemented in 1984 are …rst and foremost expected
to reduce STA because the number of self-certi…cations of up to three days duration is
reduced, which directly a¤ects STA. The results in Table 2 con…rm this expectation. One
implication of this could be that workers instead of staying home to get well, they go to
work so their health conditions worsen, ending up in LTA spells. The result is higher LTA.
Secondly, a reduced number of self-certi…cations means that it becomes more di¢cult to
be absent from work, so some people may simply choose longer absence spells if they have
to be absent. Third, the more restrictive way of counting absence days, which also was
a part of the 1984 reform, may give a direct increase in LTA: If a person is absent from
work on a Friday and the next Monday, the number of registered absence days before
the reform is two days and after four days. In this example the immediate e¤ect is that
STA is reduced by two days whereas LTA is increased by four days. According to our
results all three explanations are possible. Even if the reductions in STAW - which are
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approximately 17% and 12% in low and high unemployment - are directly transferred into
higher LTAW because of change in counting of absence days, these reductions are simply
to small to match the 11% and 18% increase in LTAW .24
On the data set used in this paper only the LIN model for LTAW gives a statistically
signi…cant estimate of the 1991 dummy. This is also an important result because it
does not support previous conclusions that the LO-NHO project reduced absence by
approximately 20%.25 Thus the results from the linear model estimated on this longer
sample period, together with the STR results, indicate that the e¤ects of this project is
over-estimated. As unemployment increased to much higher levels in the 1990s than in
the 1970s and 1980s, it seems that the results previously explained by the 1991 changes
are due to high unemployment.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have applied the Smooth Transition Regression (STR) approach to
analyse non-linear unemployment e¤ects in sickness absence among blue collar workers
in Norway in the time period 1971-1998. The estimated STR models seem well speci…ed
with the possible exception of long term absence among women. Compared to a well
speci…ed linear model, these models also explain more of the variation in absence.
The most important aim of this paper has been to try to identify whether the negative
relationship between sickness absence and unemployment is due to discipline or compo-
sition e¤ects, or both. We think that applications of STR models have been very fruitful
in this respect as a number of new results have appeared.
The estimation results point to the presence of convex penalty functions. For long term
absence, the estimated long run unemployment elasticities are -.4 for women and -.5 for
men if the rate of unemployment is higher than 1.6-1.9%. These estimates are much larger
in absolute value than those reported in previous studies on Norwegian data. However,
there are no e¤ects of changes in unemployment on long term absence if the unemploy-
ment level is below the transition values. According to our identi…cation hypotheses,
these results must be interpreted as discipline e¤ects and not composition e¤ects. On the
24The ratio LTAW /STAW was in 1984 approximately 7.5, so STAW has to be reduced by at least 66%
and 123% in order to match the increases in LTAW .
25Bru et al. (1994) is one evaluation report concluding that the LO-NHO project reduced absence by
20%, and Dyrstad and Lysø (1998) get long run e¤ects supporting this conclusion, at least for LTAW .
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other hand, neither discipline nor composition e¤ects seem to be present for short term
absence among women. Short term absence among men is a¤ected by changes in unem-
ployment but the unemployment e¤ects are much smaller as compared to those for long
term absence, and it is not possible to draw conclusions regarding the relative importance
of discipline and composition e¤ects for this type of absence.
These di¤erences between short and long term absence are opposite to those reported
in Dyrstad and Lysø (1998), and are partly explained by the application of non-linear
models, and partly by a longer estimation period containing both higher levels of unem-
ployment and larger unemployment changes. Under the reasonable assumption that it
is more serious sickness among those on long term absence spells than among those on
short term spells, one may argue as in ibid., that only those who are not seriously sick can
be disciplined. Hence, one expect discipline e¤ects …rst and foremost to appear in short
term absence. The long term absence rates which we have used in this analysis refer to
absence spells lasting from four days to one year. This means that rather short absence
spells - but of more than three days duration - are classi…ed as long term absence, and
that the above argument may still be valid. Thus both the longer estimation period and
the STR approach have revealed other relationships between absence and unemployment,
and other interpretations.
One may also put the argument above the other way around: Those with bad health
and corresponding long term absence spells are more afraid of loosing their jobs than
those on short term absence spells because they see themselves as marginal workers. A
consequence of this is that it is not surprising to …nd the strongest discipline e¤ects in
long term absence.
The estimated wage e¤ects support this conclusion. The wage elasticities for long
term absence are negative and much larger in absolute value when unemployment is high,
which is most reasonably interpreted as due to discipline mechanisms: If unemployment
is high, and the wage level increases, it also becomes more expensive to loose a job.
In accordance with this, we estimate positive elasticities for short term absence among
women with a much smaller di¤erence between high and low unemployment, and …nd no
signi…cant wage e¤ects for short term absence among men.
As mentioned in the introduction, composition and discipline e¤ects have di¤erent
policy implications: Composition e¤ects point in direction of micro measures whereas
20
discipline e¤ects point at macro measures. Finding that discipline e¤ects are more im-
portant than composition e¤ects thus points at restrictions in the sick pay scheme if the
government wants to reduce sickness absence. This conclusion is largely supported by the
estimated e¤ects of actual changes in the sick pay scheme during the estimation period.
The sick pay scheme changes in 1974, 1978 and 1984 a¤ect …rst and foremost short
term absence with estimates according to our expectations, pointing at discipline e¤ects
also for this type of absence. Looking at long term absence, however, the picture is a bit
mixed. As the 1974 reform was directed towards short term absence, it is not surprising
that it gives no e¤ects on long term absence. The generally more generous sick pay scheme
implemented in 1978 increases long term absence for both women and men. One may
question whether the result that these e¤ects are larger when unemployment is high is
consistent with the above interpretations of discipline e¤ects. Our answer is yes, because
discipline e¤ects are stronger when unemployment is high, so that the discipline pressure
may be reduced due to this general improvement in the sick pay scheme.
Also the restrictions implemented in 1984 were directed towards short term absence,
so it is a bit surprising that they increase long term absence among women, and that
the increases are stronger if unemployment is high. The 1984 reform reduce short term
absence among women more strongly if unemployment is high, so it is possible that this
pops up in a stronger increase in long term absence if unemployment is high. Contrary
to this is the fact that we do not see this relationship for men, as the 1984 change does
not a¤ect long term absence for this group.
With the exception of the 1978 reform, these reforms concern short term absence most
directly, whereas the estimated discipline e¤ects are found to be strongest for long term
absence. Consequently, and in accordance with our results, policy measures should be
directed towards the particular absence spells which one want to a¤ect, and at the same
time take possible spill-over e¤ects on the length of absence spells into account.
In general our results point at the importance of keeping an eye on the labour market
because both wage and unemployment changes, and particularly the level of unemploy-
ment, seem to be very important. If unemployment is low, and seems to be staying low,
policy measures seem to be less e¤ective as compared to a situation of high unemployment.
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APPENDIX
Parameter Estimates and t-values of Parsimonious Models
Short term absence,
women
Short term absence,
men
Long term absence,
women
Long term absence,
men
γ 11.531.88
484.40
73.73
2.47
1.48
20.52
0.69
C 2.5722.44
1.65
11.05
1.64
4.20
1.86
26.65
Constant -1.50-2.71
0.15
3.74
3.77
6.73
2.50
4.56
at-1
-0.77
-7.85
-0.76
-4.86
-0.74
-8.58
-0.39
-5.02
∆at-1
-0.23
-2.13
-0.25
-2.07
-0.18
-2.95
wt-1
0.26
3.55
-0.26
-4.38
-0.20
-3.69
∆wt-1 -0.38-1.96
ut-1
-0.10
-2.47
∆ut
-0.10
-2.77
-0.07
-3.13
s74t-1
0.13
4.05
s78t-1
0.18
5.63
0.05
2.94
0.03
2.70
s84t-1
-0.13
-4.67
-0.18
-6.85
0.08
4.80
s91t-1
-0.13
-5.34
∆s78t-1 -0.06-1.58
∆s84t
-0.20
-3.19
-0.17
-2.85
0.07
1.91
Q1 0.073.23
0.09
4.00
Q2 -0.14-4.39
-0.06
-2.02
-0.14
-9.36
-0.14
-12.77
Q3 -0.13-6.34
-0.12
-5.09
-0.22
-18.32
-0.12
-10.23
Non-linear parameters:
Constant 0.445.20
-0.25
-1.54
 at-1 -0.34-6.94
-0.79
-5.18
0.30
3.01
0.18
2.37
∆at-1 0.444.70
0.61
5.25
-0.28
-4.31
wt-1 -0.05-1.42
ut-1 -0.19-4.05
-0.18
-3.34
-0.10
-3.37
∆Ut -0.15-2.74
-0.13
-4.17
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